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Political Compromise and Dirty Hands 
 
Edward Hall, University of Sheffield 
 
Abstract 
In this article, I offer a novel account of why compromising in politics is likely to involve the kind of 
politically admirable but morally wrongful behaviour at stake in the dirty hands thesis. On the view I 
defend, politicians do not dirty their hands just because they compromise on matters of principle. 
Rather, when forging a political compromise, negotiators can either comply with the requirements of 
ethical compromise-making or abide by the special obligations they have to their representees, but will 
struggle to satisfy both demands. As a result, subsequent to such compromises, residual moral claims 
about how the compromise was negotiated will almost inevitably emerge and compromise-makers will 
not be able to explain their conduct in a way that can cancel these grievances. It is in this sense that 
forging political compromises can be dirty even if choosing to compromise is the politically responsible 
thing to do. 
 
Many scholars of political ethics who address the problem of dirty hands include 
‘compromising’ in their list of acts that admirable politicians will sometimes engage 
in but that nevertheless implicate them in wrongdoing.1 Unfortunately, they rarely 
explain why forging political compromises has this worrying moral consequence. I 
offer a novel account of why political compromise-making is highly likely to do so in 
adversarial democratic regimes. My argument is that subsequent to the forging of a 
political compromise a politician’s representees or their co-compromisers (and 
sometimes both) are likely to have residual moral claims about how the compromise 
was negotiated. Political compromise-makers will not be able to explain or justify their 
conduct in a way that cancels these grievances. So even if forging a particular political 
compromise is the politically responsible thing to do, and can thus be vindicated on 
                                               
1 One must thus distinguish between dirty compromises, which ought to be made despite the moral 
wrongdoing they involve, and so-called “rotten compromises” which some argue should never be 
forged. This article addresses the former. For discussion of the latter see Avishai Margalit, On 
Compromise and Rotten Compromises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).   
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balance, the act of compromising is highly likely to generate moral wrongdoing of the 
sort involved in standard accounts of the problem of dirty hands. This is because 
representatives who must negotiate political compromises face two conflicting moral 
demands which they cannot fully satisfy. On the one hand, they must accord with the 
requirements of ethical compromise-making while, on the other, they must act as 
faithful and committed advocates for their representees. This second point is often 
downplayed in the literature on compromise in political theory which 
overwhelmingly addresses the question of how, if at all, compromising on matters of 
principle can be justified – with reciprocity, mutual respect, and public justification 
being the most commonly considered candidates.2 Given that, in one way or another, 
nearly all political disputes involve conflicts of principle this is clearly an important 
question. But there are other important ethical questions we should ask about 
compromising in politics such as the one I pursue in this article.  
I start by setting out the problem of dirty hands. I then examine the nature of 
political compromises, outlining the cursory ways much of the extant literature frames 
the relationship between dirty hands and political compromise before addressing 
Chiara Lepora’s and Robert Goodin’s sophisticated account of why, even if it can be 
justified overall, compromising on matters of principle generates serious moral costs. 
Following this, I argue that despite the merits of their account, Lepora and Goodin 
cannot explain why politicians who opt to compromise on matters of principle have 
engaged in the kind of moral wrongdoing at stake in the dirty hands debate. Having 
                                               
2 For influential discussions see Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Toward a Politics of 
Compromise (London: Routledge, 1999); Christian Rostboll, “Democratic Respect and Compromise”, 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20, no. 5, (2017), 619 – 635; Fabian Wendt, 
Compromise, Peace, and Public Justification: Political Morality Beyond Justice (London: Palgrave , 2016). Cf. 
Simon May, “Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, 
no. 4 (2005), 317 – 348.         
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made this point, I develop my main argument that compromising in politics is likely 
to require one to dirty one’s hands by showing that a conflict obtains between the 
ethical requirements of good compromise-making and the obligations that apply to 
professional politicians as representatives who are tasked with robustly advocating 
for their representees. In the penultimate section, I respond to a number of counter-
arguments to my view.  
 
The problem of dirty hands 
The proposal that admirable agents may sometimes have to engage in action that 
should be morally condemned is at the beating heart of the so-called “problem” of 
dirty hands.3 If they do, adherents of the dirty hands thesis suggest they are guilty of 
moral wrongdoing and that a “lingering sense of wrongness” should be preserved in 
our judgement of their behaviour.4  Some philosophers balk at the dirty hands thesis 
for this reason, alleging that it offends against basic standards of rationality via its 
implication that one does right and wrong simultaneously.5 But defenders of the thesis 
insist that it is entirely possible that agents, reasoning in good faith, can be moved “by 
moral considerations to commit moral violations”.6 The political interest of the dirty 
hands thesis arises from the fact that we have reason to believe that such situations 
arise regularly in politics. It is commonly claimed that politicians may have to lie, 
                                               
3 Michael Walzer, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands”, in Thinking Politically: Essays in 
Political Theory, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 278-295.  
4 Dennis Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1998), 13.  
5 Kai Neilsen, ‘There is No Dilemma of Dirty Hands’ in Politics and Morality, ed. Igor Primoratz 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007), 30.  
6 Steve de Wijze, ‘Dirty Hands: Doing Wrong to Do Right’, in Politics and Morality, 12.  
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deceive, break their promises, manipulate others, and even authorise murder and 
violence if they are to act well as politicians.7 
I hold that dirty hands arise when an agent must choose between conflicting 
absolute moral claims because this ensures that whatever they do a particularly 
significant kind of moral remainder will obtain. Following Stuart Hampshire, I 
understand absolute moral claims as those not “conditional on, or subordinate to, any 
further moral claim or purpose”.8  The normative force of an absolute moral claim is 
not dependent on, or reducible to, a more supreme moral value or a more fundamental 
decision procedure for moral reasoning.  Calling a moral claim absolute in this sense 
signals that there are no circumstances in which it ceases to be morally relevant or 
altogether lacks normative force. This is not to be confused with the suggestion that 
absolute moral claims necessarily defeat all other claims, not least because a moral 
claim may be absolute in this sense and conflict with another absolute moral claim. 
When this occurs, regardless of how one chooses to act, one of the absolute moral 
claims is “in the final decision overridden, even though it has not lapsed”.9 The 
suggestion that the diverse moral claims that give substance to our ethical and 
political lives cannot either be reduced to or regulated by a supreme value (e.g. utility) 
or moral decision procedure (e.g. the categorical imperative) is thus fundamental to 
the dirty hands thesis.  
I thus follow Stephen de Wijze in holding that dirty hands arise when two 
competing moral claims “cannot be satisfied and deciding to act one way rather than 
                                               
7 See John Parrish, Paradoxes of Political Ethics: From Dirty Hands to the Invisible Hand (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2; Bernard Williams, ‘Politics and the Moral Character’, in Moral 
Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973 – 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 58.  
8 Stuart Hampshire, “Public and Private Morality” in Morality and Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1983), 115.  
9 Ibid., 116.  
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another does not eradicate all the force of the other”. In such cases, although the 
overridden value “may not serve to guide one’s action … it still remains to exert an 
influence on how one feels, and importantly, on what one has become”.10 However, 
this characterisation needs to be supplemented given that the moral phenomenon 
described also transpires in numerous everyday situations where agents must choose 
between incommensurable values.  Many of the momentous decisions we make about 
our lives require us to sacrifice some values/principles in order to have a chance of 
realizing other values/principles, but it stretches credulity to insist that these weighty 
choices inevitably implicate us in grievous moral wrongdoing at stake in the dirty 
hands thesis. For this reason, we must distinguish the remainders associated with 
dirty handed decision making from more commonplace remainders that are 
generated when agents choose between plural and conflicting values. 
De Wijze himself acknowledges this, arguing what sets dirty hands apart from 
ordinary moral conflict is that the agent is “immorally coerced to further an evil 
project’ instigated by others, ‘because of moral values she may hold”.11 I disagree. As 
I show in this article by discussing compromising in politics, dirty hands can arise 
absent the kind of “immoral coercion” de Wijze has in mind. In contrast to de Wijze, 
I hold that one dirties one’s hands when one makes a good-faith choice between plural 
and conflicting values in a way that generates “residual moral claims” from other 
agents. Consider the examples that drive Michael Walzer’s path-breaking analysis. In 
the former, a candidate must decide whether or not to make a shady deal with a 
                                               
10 De Wijze, “Dirty Hands”, 8. For further discussion see Christina Nick, “Can Our Hands Stay Clean?”, 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22, (2019), 926; Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), 13.  
11 De Wijze, “Dirty Hands”, 15-16.  
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corrupt ward boss in order to win an election. So long as this is a significant enough 
election, Walzer claims they should, despite their own misgivings and despite the fact 
that many of their supporters support them because they believe they would not make 
such a deal. In the second, he claims that a political leader must authorise the use of 
torture in order to prevent a devastating terrorist attack harming their citizens.12 In 
both cases, the moral remainder the decision generates has a unique character. It does 
not simply signal that a good-faith attempt to choose between plural and competing 
values has occurred and that this decision has not nullified the normative force of the 
moral claims that were, in the final instance, overridden. Beyond that, both examples 
also suggest that other agents – in the former case, the candidate’s supporters, and in 
the second, the torture victim – have a residual moral claim against the politician 
because they have, in one way or another, been wronged by the politician’s decision 
even if it can be justified all-things-considered.  Indeed, in both cases the public at 
large might have a legitimate moral complaint about the politician’s behaviour insofar 
as authorising torture and engaging in political corruption arguably violate core 
standards which professional politicians are expected to uphold because they 
underpin the democratic politics itself.            
This explains the force of Walzer’s insistence that the dirty handed politician is 
“guilty of a moral wrong” and that acknowledging this is the only way he can show 
us “both that he is not too good for politics and that he is good enough”.13 Similarly, 
Bernard Williams holds that even if a politician has made the best decision all-things-
considered, various people can still have a “justified grievance” and be reasonably 
                                               
12 Walzer, “Political Action”, 282-84.   
13 Ibid., 279.  
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resentful about the way they have behaved. In such scenarios, Williams claims that it 
is wrong to “expect those particular people who have been cheated, used or injured 
to approve of the agent’s action, nor should they be subjected to the patronising 
thought that, while their complaints are not justified in terms of the whole picture, 
they are too closely involved to be able to see that truth”.14 According to Williams, we 
should refrain from admonishing these people for failing to see the world from some 
supposedly authoritative (because unprejudiced) “independent” point of view. 
Instead, we respect them by accepting they have, indeed, been wronged.  
With this understanding of the problem of dirty hands in place, in the next 
section I consider the ethics of compromising. 
 
Making sense of compromise 
Compromise is a way of peacefully resolving a dispute or conflict. The need to 
compromise obtains when “two or more actors have conflicting individual or 
collective goals and/or principles, and where these actors stand to benefit from 
reaching an agreement or embarking on a course of action rather than from 
maintaining the status quo”.15 For such an agreement to occur, all sides must make 
sacrifices which are determined by the will and tenacity of their opponents. Because 
compromising involves sacrifices of this sort, each party ends up getting less than they 
want, and often less than they think they are entitled to.16  
                                               
14 Bernard Williams, “Moral Luck”, in Moral Luck, 37.  
15 Richard Bellamy et al, “Introduction: Meeting in the Middle”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 47, No. 
3, (2012), 284.  
16 See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, The Spirit of Compromise, Why Governing Demands It and 
Campaigning Undermines It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 10; Andrew Sabl, “Necessary 
Compromise and Public Harm”, in Compromise: NOMOS LIX, 248.  
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Thus, all compromises involve mutual concessions. Moreover, from the 
perspective of the affected parties, though compromising improves the status quo it 
is always suboptimal with regard to their understanding of their legitimate 
entitlements and/or preferred outcomes.17 That one who accepts a compromise still 
sees their initial position as superior to the compromise agreement explains the 
ambivalence we feel when assessing compromises from the moral point of view.    
Theorists often include compromise in their lists of dirty handed political 
decisions. John Parrish remarks that in politics one must often “lie, betray, 
compromise, abandon, mislead, manipulate, coerce, or otherwise act in ways that, 
were one not to claim one’s political responsibilities as an excuse, would seem 
thoroughly vicious and corrupt”.18 Similarly, David Archard stresses that “The reality 
of quotidian politics is that politicians must frequently deceive, break promises, lie, 
cheat, bully, and compromise”.19  
 These bold claims ought to be treated with caution. Anyone who has enjoyed a 
meaningful personal relationship will have engaged in compromise on numerous 
occasions in order to sustain that relationship without thinking they were involved in 
grievous wrongdoing. The way that compromise is often cast alongside deception, 
manipulation, coercion, and the sanctioning of violence in the dirty hands rogues’ 
                                               
17 See Bellamy et al, “Introduction: Meeting in the Middle”, 284; Daniel Weinstock, “Compromise, 
Pluralism, and Deliberation”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 5, 
(2017), 628. This is why political compromises must be distinguished from cases of moral correction 
where adversaries change their minds and end up agreeing about the optimal thing to do: Simon May, 
“Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, no. 4 (2005), 
318-19; Christian Rostboll, “Democratic Respect and Compromise”, Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 5, (2017), 622.   
18 Parrish, Paradoxes of Political Ethics, 2.  
19 David Archard, “Dirty Hands and the Complicity of the Democratic Public”, Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice, 16, No. 4, (2013), 781. See also Neil Levy, “Punishing the Dirty”, in Politics and Morality, 52-3, 
endnote 26.  
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gallery should therefore be treated with caution; these latter acts are (at least) 
presumptively righwrong in non-political contexts in a way that compromise does not 
appear to be.  
Of course, one might insist that compromising in politics is inevitably dirty 
because nearly all political disputes involve conflicts of principle and the only morally 
upright way to respond to invitations to compromise on matters of principle is to 
refuse. Indeed, hard-nosed interpretations of morality, which overwhelmingly think 
of moral claims in the language of moral obligation and paint these obligations as 
categorical requirements, often suggest that moral principles simply should not be 
subject to negotiation. According to proponents of such views,  if one views one’s 
principles as valid, and therefore considers oneself to be on the right side of a moral 
or political conflict, it is hard to see how the other party can have a “a legitimate claim 
that must be taken into account and satisfied to some degree”.20  Compromise is 
consequently presented as a ‘temptation’ or ‘corruption’ which the moral politician 
must refuse on pain of becoming complicit in the perpetration of a morally regrettable 
state of affairs, and degrading their moral integrity.21   
I believe this view, often unspoken or assumed, underwrites the cursory 
attempts to link the making of political compromises with the dirtying of one’s hands 
examined above. But there are two basic errors with attempting to impugn 
compromising on matters of principle in politics in this way. First, those who reason 
                                               
20 Theodore Benditt, “Compromising Interests and Principles”, in NOMOS XXI: Compromise in Ethics, 
Law, and Politics, ed. Pencock and Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 31.  
21 For useful discussion of this way of thinking about compromise see Eric Beerbohm, “The Problem of 
Clean Hands: Negotiated Compromise in Lawmaking”, in Jack Knight (ed.), Compromise: NOMOS LIX, 
20; Benditt, “Compromising Interests and Principles”, 31; Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: 
Compromise and Integrity in Politics (Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1990), 8; Sabl, “Necessary 
Compromise and Public Harm”, 248. 
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about compromise in this way are committing a category mistake. Anyone who 
engages in a political compromise knows that the settlement they reach will not fully 
express their principled commitments and/or view of their legitimate entitlements (or 
of their representees). But this does not reveal that they have displayed a lack of moral 
integrity and genuine normative commitment. To see why, consider G.A. Cohen’s 
distinction between the “fundamental normative principles” which express our deep 
moral commitments and the “rules of regulation” that we adopt to realize those 
principles in our imperfect world.22 Drawing on this distinction, Eric Beerbohm 
suggests that “the site of the back and forth of compromise was what rules of 
regulation to adopt, given the background disagreement about … moral principles”.23  
Those who refuse to compromise on matters of principle, because they think this is a 
morally corrupt enterprise, thus overlook the distinction between the evaluative 
judgements one makes about the world and the practical decisions one makes about 
how to act in it. One we recognise this, it is unclear why choosing to make political 
compromises on matters of principle necessarily means that one betrays their 
normative principles. Of course, some political compromises might legitimately be 
impugned for that reason, but it is fallacious to think that all can be.  
 Second, one might object to the uncompromising stance on normative grounds. 
In politics, it is sometimes necessary to compromise in order to mitigate public harm. 
For example, compromising on the debt ceiling might be necessary to avoid a 
government shutdown.24 Or one might need to make tactical concessions to facilitate 
a compromise that improves an unjust status quo, as Nye Bevan did by agreeing to 
                                               
22 G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2008), 21.  
23 Beerbohm, “The Problem of Clean Hands”, 22.  
24 Sabl, “Necessary Compromise and Public Harm”, 263 – 266.  
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maintain aspects of private healthcare in the construction of the British National 
Health Service (NHS) when he was Minister of Health in the aftermath of World War 
II.25  
Such considerations generate normative reasons to compromise:    
 
P1. In a democracy, compromise is often necessary if one is to significantly 
improve the status quo or mitigate serious public harm.26  
 
P2. If the status quo denies citizens’ their rightful entitlements and could be 
ameliorated (if not fully rectified) by compromise, or the threat of impending 
public harm can be avoided by compromise, then politicians who refuse to 
compromise are in some way responsible for the suffering that results from their 
intransigence.27  
 
C. Politicians have good reason to compromise when refusing to do so will either 
cause public harm or preserve a remediable, unjust status quo.   
 
This illustrates why it is foolish and dangerous to see politics as a purity contest 
in the way that advocates of the uncompromising stance implicitly urge: foolish 
because this view rests on an impoverished philosophical understanding of the 
relationship between abstract principle and practical decision making and dangerous 
because it is likely to implicate one in wrongdoing, perpetrate harm, and preclude the 
amelioration of the status quo.  
It would be a form of grave self-indulgence for a politician to refuse to 
compromise just because of the moral discomfort they feel about agreeing to a 
settlement that does not fully live up to their principles and values. This is not to say 
that, in such a situation, it would be irrational for them to feel regret (as we will see 
below). But when one poses the practical question of whether or not to compromise, 
                                               
25 Mark Philp, “What Is To Be Done? Political Theory and Political Realism”, European Journal of Political 
Theory, Vol. 9, No. 4, (2010), 479.  
26 See Suzanne Dovi, The Good Representative (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 164; Gutmann and Thompson, 
The Spirit of Compromise, 101; Sabl, “Necessary Compromise and Public Harm”, 260.  
27 See Benjamin, Splitting the Difference, 149; Gutmann and Thompson, The Spirit of Compromise, 108.  
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politicians ought not to be governed by the desire to minimise their personal moral 
discomfort but the need to deliver the best (or least-worst) outcomes. If they attempt 
to preserve their moral purity by refusing to compromise they should be reproached 
for failing to accord with a political ethic of responsibility.28   
Lepora and Goodin develop a more sophisticated account of how agents 
should reason about compromising, stressing that agents who compromise acquire 
responsibility for what they agree to do collectively as co-principals to an agreement. 
They highlight two distinct forms of responsibility: committing responsibility (for 
what one agrees to undertake as part of a compromise) and omitting responsibility 
(for what one agrees to omit doing as part of a compromise). Given that, from the 
perspective of all parties, compromise settlements are sub-optimal, various things one 
commits or omits to do will be regarded as pro tanto wrong by the co-principals. 
However, that parties to a compromise regret aspects of the agreement does not limit 
their responsibility because even if one acts regretfully this does not mean one has 
acted involuntarily.29   
Lepora and Goodin maintain that compromising on matters of principle will 
often be experienced as morally discomforting and this should be so. They maintain 
that regret is not only appropriate but the correct way of recognising the “moral 
gravity” of the decisions one makes even if opting to compromise can be justified in 
                                               
28 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, in Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1994), 309-369. See also Susan Mendus, Politics and Morality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); 
Thomas Nagel, “Ruthlessness in Public Life”, in Public and Private Morality, edited by Stuart Hampshire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 75 – 92. In this spirit, Nick powerfully suggests that 
when confronted with a dirty hands situation, one’s hands might emerge dirty however one chooses 
to behave: “Can Our Hands Stay Clean?”, passim.   
29 Chiara Lepora and Robert Goodin, On Complicity and Compromise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 23-26.  
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terms of the moral bottom line.30 And despite accepting that the bottom line must be 
“morally veridical”, they maintain their framework promises “a way through the 
conundrum of the dirty hands debate” because it shows why one ought to act on the 
bottom line while also explaining why acting in this way generates serious moral costs 
which those responsible for the compromise should regret.31 
In this section I have discussed the ethical quandaries that compromising 
throws up in general and noted the attractions of Lepora and Goodin’s approach. 
However, in the next section, I argue that their framework needs to be supplemented 
in various ways if it is to help us to make sense of the ethical complexity inherent in 
compromising in democratic politics.   
   
The “bads” political compromises spawn  
Despite the virtues of Lepora’s and Goodin’s general framework for thinking about 
the ethically fraught nature of compromising on matters of principle, it struggles to 
explain why political compromises ineluctably seem to generate dirty hands for a 
number of reasons. First, their framework presents choosing to compromise as much 
like any other morally difficult decision agents may make because all genuinely 
difficult moral decisions can be analysed in terms of the goods and bads of 
commission or omission. Though there is a sense in which this is an attractive feature 
of their framework, it obscures some salient ways that political compromises differ 
morally from other regretful decisions ordinary agents sometimes make. If we are to 
make sense of the relationship between political compromise and the problem of dirty 
                                               
30 Ibid., 28. 
31 Ibid, 28, note 23.  
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hands we need to pay more attention to the distinctive “bads” political compromises 
spawn. 
Consider two compromises that a committed egalitarian politician (Anna) may 
agree to. In the former, she and her politically conservative partner Ben must reach a 
decision about whether their children will attend the local, state school (Anna’s 
choice) or an expensive private school (Ben’s choice). They agree to a compromise 
where the children will attend the private school on condition that Ben agrees to give 
away a high-proportion of his inheritance to a charity that funds educational 
initiatives for disadvantaged children. In the second, a conflict about public funding 
of the university sector has arisen in Anna’s state and neither of the party leaderships 
can secure the votes to implement their favoured view without establishing cross-
party support. One of the main parties has a history of cutting public funding of 
universities while Anna’s has persistently sought to increase it. Moreover, Anna’s 
constituency contains a large university that also employs a host of her constituents 
whom she must represent alongside a sizable student population. For these reasons, 
Anna strongly desires to maintain current levels of funding. Yet after much 
deliberation, she supports a compromise which maintains funding for STEM subjects 
on condition that degrees in the humanities social sciences are defunded. Though she 
detests the way the bailout distinguishes between different academic disciplines, she 
does so because she believes the compromise provides the university sector with the 
greatest degree of continued funding among the realistic alternatives on offer.  
Because Lepora’s and Goodin’s framework addresses compromise simpliciter 
it pushes us to regard these cases as more or less identical. It suggests that Anna 
should feel similarly regretful about her role in bringing about prima facie wrongs 
Forthcoming, The Review of Politics 
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despite doing the right thing on balance in both scenarios. But if we are to make sense 
of the second case, we need to pay close attention to the kinds of “bads” Anna becomes 
responsible for. There is a distinctive wrong involved in the second example which a 
compelling account of the relationship between political compromise and dirty hands 
must capture. In the second scenario, Anna sacrifices something of great concern to 
her representees when compromising.  
To get to grips with the moral dimensions of political compromise, we thus 
need to foreground the fact that politicians act as representatives. If we do not, we will 
be unable to make sense of the reasonable political resentments that even responsible 
political decision-making generates. This point has been powerfully made by Anton 
Ford, who uses it to cast doubt on the suggestion that politicians should make 
concessions to the other side which may be counter-productive to the pursuit of justice 
even if they are not required by strategic considerations or the balance of power.32 
Like Ford, in this article I emphasise the resentments that representees may make 
about political compromises reached on their behalf. But, to preview the argument to 
come, I also stress that co-compromisers can resent the ways that their adversaries 
negotiated a compromise in order to do right by their representees in the kind of way 
Ford, in effect, advocates. 
Second, we have seen that Lepora and Goodin suggest that when politicians 
decide to compromise they must be guided by the bottom line and accept 
responsibility for the goods and bads that compromising generates, regretting their 
role in the perpetration of bad even if this is necessary to bring about greater good. 
                                               
32 Anton Ford, “Third Parties to Compromise”, in Compromise: NOMOS LIX ed. Jack Knight, (New York: 
New York University Press, 2018), 53 – 79. 
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While this approach may seem congenial to the dirty hands thesis, many dirty hands 
theorists do not merely argue that politicians who authorise such decisions should 
feel regret. They also claim that some bads generated by dirty-handed decision 
making are so serious that politicians ought to recognise that by authorising such 
actions they are “guilty of a moral wrong”.33 Even if justified all-things-considered, 
such decisions generate what I refer to as residual moral claims.   
 Lepora’s and Goodin’s framework cannot explain how or why such residual 
moral claims obtain. We have seen that political compromises are sometimes 
necessary to avoid public harm and improve the status quo from the perspective of 
the principles one seeks to advance. If one accepts this, and endorses Lepora’s and 
Goodin’s framework, it is hard to see how third parties could have a comprehensible 
residual moral claim against the politician who makes the right choice, all-things-
considered, when they agree to compromise.  
The account of the distinctive bads of political compromise articulated earlier 
suggests one way such claims might be articulated from within their framework. To 
wit, it is tempting to hold that if politicians compromise on issues of principled 
concern to their representees they grievously violate their trust by abusing the core of 
the representative-representee relationship they are in. This appears to be Garrett 
Cullity’s view when he states that even if a compromise is “skilfully practised” it 
nonetheless “always leaves some group with a legitimate complaint about the betrayal 
of trust”.34 However, this position is hard to sustain. If compromising can be valuable 
because it promotes outcomes that a politician pursues on behalf of their representees, 
                                               
33 Walzer, “Political Action”, 279.  
34 Garrett Cullity, “The Moral, the Personal and the Political”, in Politics and Morality, 58.   
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as I have argued, it is inapt to characterize all compromises on matters of principle as 
grievous violations of trust. A politician who makes strategic concessions in order to 
faithfully and robustly advocate for their representees should feel regret and 
experience moral discomfort, but blaming them for acting in this way is undue. They 
can plead that by acting as they did, in a situation where they could not simply get 
their own way, they did right by their representees insofar as the circumstances 
regretfully allowed. In such cases, it is not clear their representees have a legitimate 
complaint against them. The politician has simply reacted to a recalcitrant political 
world, as they must.  
This is not to deny that some political compromises will violate the trust of 
supporters in a way that can appropriately generate blame and residual moral claims. 
Think of a case where all prospective parliamentary candidates of a party sign a well-
publicised pledge stating that, if returned at an upcoming general election, they will 
vote against P and the overwhelming majority of their voter’s regard this as a sincere 
declaration. However, subsequent to the election, the party becomes the junior 
members of coalition and many of the elected candidates vote for P as part of a 
compromise which they believe best promotes their manifesto commitments taken as 
a whole. If the compromise really does have this character, it might be regarded as a 
dirty-handed political compromise, one that generates residual moral claims from 
third-parties and not merely regret on the part of the politicians, because this 
behaviour is genuinely morally condemnable. This is because the members of the 
party who voted for P could simultaneously be charged with violating the trust of 
their supporters, because they override prior promissory commitments that were 
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taken up by them in the relevant way, even though their decision could, perhaps, be 
vindicated all-things-considered.35 
Similarly, if a politician agrees to a compromise which sanctions the violation 
of some people’s basic rights for consequentialist reasons – for example, by agreeing 
to support new national security legislation which permits the use of “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” while robustly protecting against more “traditional” forms 
of torture – we might think that they should still be blamed, even if we think the 
compromise was, on balance, worth making.   
So some of the time, agreeing to political compromises that improve the status 
quo can generate residual moral claims of the sort we are concerned with. However, 
in liberal democracies, political compromises that involve political parties violating 
cast-iron promises that are accepted at face value by voters or which systematically 
violate citizens’ basic human rights are mercifully rare. Most political compromises 
are more pedestrian even when they concern issues of principle. Thus, if the above 
noted kinds of political compromise alone generate dirty hands, the bold claims 
theorists make about the ineliminable relationship between compromising in politics 
and dirtying one’s hands seem overblown and sensationalist – the vast majority of 
political compromises are simply not this dramatic or normatively stark. 
This is a standing possibility. Maybe only a small subset of political 
compromises truly has the potential to dirty a politician’s hands. But I think we should 
resist this deflationary conclusion because, as I argue in the next section, a politician 
                                               
35 For an account of the importance of “uptake” in such contexts see Judith Thompson, The Realm of 
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is likely to become blameworthy in the act of compromising rather than simply by 
choosing to compromise.  
 
Why political compromises are often dirty 
In this section, I argue that a politician who seeks to justify compromising on strategic 
grounds – that is, as a way of enabling them to act as a faithful and committed 
advocate for their representees in difficult political circumstances – who on Lepora’s 
and Goodin’s account appears blameless, is in fact likely to become blameworthy in 
the act of negotiating a compromise. To see why, I explain how the ethical 
requirements of good compromise-making conflict with the obligation political 
representatives have to robustly advocate for their representees.   
Though the literature does not answer the question of what the ethical 
requirements of compromise-making are in a single voice, there are family 
resemblances between leading accounts which suggest three key features. First, that 
compromising, in contrast to other forms of negotiation such as bargaining, requires 
each party to willingly accommodate the other side even if this means that the 
resulting settlement does not secure the best possible outcome for themselves. Thus, 
Theodore Benditt declares that in a true compromise “a person has a certain sort of 
respect for his opponent, because of which he is willing to agree to an accommodation 
rather than make the best deal … he can”.36 Similarly, Richard Bellamy maintains that 
when negotiating a good compromise, one must refrain from seeking “to get as much 
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as of their own way as they can” and instead “try to accommodate others as far as 
possible”.37  
Second, though compromise requires mutual concessions, one should refrain 
from pushing the other side into making “disproportionate concessions” which fall 
“below a threshold of acceptability with respect to their core values”.38 Such 
settlements must be avoided because they fail to show the other side respect. 
The third major element of ethics in compromise concerns the need for parties 
to negotiate in a broadly honest and transparent way. In political contexts, this means 
that adversaries must “maximise reasonable transparency”39 and practice “rich 
information-sharing and openness”.40 This demand can be contravened in various 
ways. One may present a series of sham commitments which are espoused so they can 
later be dropped “so as to increase one’s share” instead of truthfully proclaiming one’s 
credible commitments.41 Or one may exaggerate just how unacceptable a certain 
proposal is, or how costly a floated concession would be, by threatening to walk away 
unless the other party commits to the concessions one desires.42 To the extent that such 
behaviour is deceptive it is objectionable; deception has the potential to invalidate the 
binding nature of the compromise by undermining the “authenticity of the consent 
given by one of more of the parties”.43  Indeed, Martin Benjamin proposes that seeking 
to a secure a “competitive edge” by exploiting one’s power, or engaging in various 
                                               
37 Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, 111. 
38 Weinstock, “Compromise, Pluralism, and Deliberation”, 652.  
39 Michele Moody-Adams, “Democratic Conflict and the Political Morality of Compromise”, in 
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40 Bellamy et al, “Introduction: Meeting in the Middle”, 288.  
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kinds of deception, corrupts the practice of compromising by eviscerating its moral 
preconditions.44  
Though there is a great deal to be said in favour of this vision of ethics in 
compromise, it is no great stretch to suppose that these principles condemn almost all 
of the hard-won political compromises we revere. This should lead us to ask if 
admirable politicians would, in fact, accord with these moral requirements when 
negotiating a political compromise. Consider the UK’s attempt to extricate itself from, 
and determine its future relationship with, the EU. It is implausible to claim that, in 
this politically fraught negotiation, David Davis or Michel Barnier would have acted 
in a politically responsible manner by being completely transparent about the 
concessions they were prepared to make, and those they considered beyond the pale, 
at the onset of the negotiations. Nor would they have acted in a politically responsible 
way had they unilaterally attempted to accommodate the other side without any 
guarantee they would be accommodated in turn. It may be the case that the fact that  
much real politics is characterised by the kind of mutual mistrust and anxiety that 
beset the Brexit negotiations is lamentable, even if it is in some sense inevitable. But 
the important point is that had Davis or Barnier unilaterally accorded with the 
requirements of ethics in compromise they would have left themselves open to 
manipulation and disadvantaged their representees. In other words, they would have 
acted in a politically negligent way.  
It thus appears that the adversarial contexts in which political compromises are 
forged limit the extent to which we can expect good politicians to abide by the 
requirements of ethical compromise making. This supports a core element of the dirty 
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hands literature: the claim that the competitive contexts in which they must act 
drastically “limit the range of effective actions available to the serious politician”.45 A 
reckoning with political reality problematizes the claim that a good politician should 
always conform to the requirements of ethical compromising-making. The problem is 
not that doing so is often politically inconvenient; it is that doing so is likely to mean 
that a politician will fail to do right by their representees.  
So what it takes to be an effective and responsible representative must play a 
fundamental role in our judgements about whether or not a politician acts well when 
negotiating a compromise. Though the literature on political representation is legion 
and increasingly technical, I take it as uncontroversial that, in a democracy, 
representatives must act as faithful and committed advocates for their representees.46 
Though people have competing views of the proper requirements of this role, the idea 
that democratic representatives should act as faithful and committed advocates for 
their representees is ecumenical enough to be compatible with a plethora of 
reasonable views – including delegate and trustee conceptions. On the former, one 
would hold that a good representative must pursue the ends that their principals have 
entrusted them to pursue. On the latter, one would hold that a good representative 
must robustly pursue the ends that they believe will best secure their representees’ 
interests. Compromising can be a practically effective way for both delegates and 
trustees to faithfully advocate for their representees for reasons already discussed.    
                                               
45 Parrish, Paradoxes of Political Ethics, 13.  
46 Following Michael Hardimon, I understand a role obligation as a “moral requirement, which attaches 
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flows from the role”: “Role Obligations”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 91, No. 7, (1994), 333 – 363.  
Hardimon insists that for such obligations to obtain the role must be “reflectively acceptable”, 348. I 
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Many advocates of the dirty hands thesis, drawing on the realist tradition in 
political thought, insist that political efficacy is central element of plausible views of 
admirable political conduct. For example, Galston remarks that good politicians 
recognise “the responsibility to act effectively, which not infrequently entails the 
obligation to use the kinds of tactics a decent person will regard as intrinsically 
disagreeable”.47 This suggests that admirable politicians need to cultivate a particular 
disposition Galston calls “toughness” lying between the vices of squeamishness and 
callousness.48 It follows that when they compromise, they need to act “toughly” acting 
in a strategic and tenacious way for their representees.  
It does not follow that one is a good democratic representative if they robustly 
advance whatever their representees happen to desire. There are grounds for thinking 
that admirable representatives will not set out to undermine basic democratic norms 
and values.49 But so long as we do not operate with an implausibly expansive view of 
the basic norms and values that underpin democratic politics (and their concrete 
implications) we ought to acknowledge that many of the positions that mainstream 
parties in contemporary liberal democracies support are likely to fall within this 
range. In addition, some ethical constraints surely determine the boundaries of 
admirable political tenacity. After all, it is hard to give much credence to the view that 
it would have been appropriate for Davis to threaten to blackmail Barnier if he did not 
agree to endorse the May government’s proposals. Yet even if one accepts that some 
(thin) moral constraints determine the boundaries of reasonable political tenacity it 
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stretches credulity to suppose that these constraints just are the (thick) constraints 
articulated by the accounts of ethics in compromise. We have seen that politicians who 
choose to accord with these constraints when they have no guarantee their adversaries 
will reciprocate open their representees to mistreatment. If one accepts that efficacy is 
a political virtue, as nearly all commentators do50, one should acknowledge it is 
unreasonable to demand that politicians comply with a set of ethical guidelines that 
are extremely likely to render them ineffective in the pursuit of the ends they been 
entrusted to pursue.   
Though this account of “tough negotiation” is undeniably sketchy and 
incomplete, it has important implications. Recognising that politicians compromise on 
behalf of third-parties dramatically limits the appeal of views which claim that 
politicians must “offer unforced concessions that are not necessitated by balances of 
power or by any strategic consideration about how to advance justice, and that are, in 
one’s view, counterproductive to that end”.51 It also supports the view that so long as 
gross public harm is unlikely to result from refusing to compromise, sometimes 
“being a tough negotiator – even at the risk of inaction – may be politically and 
ethically admirable, as may enacting a party program that commands majority 
support while being bitterly opposed by the other side”.52  
The argument of this section thus suggests that however a politician chooses to 
negotiate a compromise residual moral claims of the relevant kind are likely to arise. 
To the extent that representatives take their role responsibility to be faithful and 
committed advocates seriously they have reason not to accord with the requirements 
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of ethics in compromise. At the same time, to the extent that representatives take the 
requirements of ethics in compromise seriously, they have reason not to negotiate 
toughly. Reasonable grievances about the way that a political compromise was 
negotiated can, therefore, be made from either direction even if the decision to 
compromise can be vindicated all-things-considered from the perspective of both 
parties. If a politician accords with the requirements of ethics in compromise, their 
representees might reasonably complain that this has come at the cost of them being 
a good advocate. On the other hand, if a politician prioritises being an effective 
advocate, she can be charged with violating the requirements of ethics in compromise. 
It is in this sense that I believe that however a politician chooses to negotiate a political 
compromise someone will be wronged. Whatever they do, their hands will be dirty.   
 
Objections and replies  
In this section I address a number of counter-arguments to my view. First, one might 
object that politicians are only obliged to refrain from negotiating in the kind of 
“tough” ways I have described if they have principled reasons to pursue fair 
compromises with their adversaries, but that they will do no wrong by negotiating 
toughly if no such reasons exist, as some have argued.53  
However, the argument advanced in this paper is in fact compatible with a 
plethora of the views that have been articulated in the debate about whether or not 
politicians have moral reasons to pursue compromises on matters of principle. Even 
if one only has instrumental or pragmatic reasons to X, it does not follow that one can 
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ignore the normative requirements associated with Xing if doing so is instrumentally 
advantageous. Imagine I agree to review a book manuscript for the perfectly 
legitimate reason that I desire the financial reward offered by the publisher rather than 
the more edifying reason that I believe I have an obligation to serve my professional 
colleagues. It would not follow that it is acceptable to only read the first half the 
manuscript and skim the rest because that would be the most efficient way of writing 
a professional looking report that would enable me to achieve my permissible end of 
getting paid. Similarly, even if a politician chooses to compromise for the kinds of 
“pragmatic” reasons May invokes, it does not follow that this cancels the normative 
requirements associated with compromising. What the normative requirements of 
Xing are is a different question to the reasons for Xing in the first place.  
This said, it is plausible that politicians do no wrong if they violate the 
requirements of ethics in compromise when the other side seek to realize manifestly 
wicked ends. One might hold that all agents are obliged to do what they can to 
mitigate such terrible outcomes and that, therefore, the requirements of ethics in 
compromise are simply cancelled. In other words, compromising with such parties 
would be “rotten” not “dirty”. However, this does not undermine my central 
argument. As argued earlier, it stretches credulity to claim that many of the positions 
mainstream parties in contemporary liberal democracies support can be regarded in 
these terms, even if we consider some of their policies/proposals unjust or morally 
problematic. 
Of course, if one holds that one has overriding moral reasons to not-X then it is 
hard to justify the need to accord with the normative requirements of Xing because 
one shouldn’t be Xing in the first place. But section 2 illustrates that cannot be the case 
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when one ponders many political compromises. My argument in that section does not 
hinge on the kind of second order values – respect, inclusion, reciprocity – May 
addresses.  
Second, one might object to my view by questioning the kind of moral 
requirement the authors who contribute the literature on ethics in compromise have 
in mind: are they merely describing various features of “good” political compromises 
or outlining the morally obligatory requirements co-compromisers are subject to in 
every compromise negotiation? Many of the contributions to that literature do not 
explicitly say. But the worry is that for the charge of dirty hands to stick, the ethical 
principles of good compromise making have to be regarded as “deontic musts” rather 
than aspirational moral claims. If they are regarded in the latter sense, when an agent 
violates them this would merely seem to generate the kind of regret that is associated 
with not doing something morally optimal, which I have argued is insufficient to 
ground the charge of dirty hands, rather than behaviour which generates residual 
moral claims of the sort which I have claimed is central to the dirty hands thesis.54 
Setting aside the fact that both kinds of moral requirement seem to be present 
(sometimes intertwined in complex ways) in many of the contributions to this 
literature, I believe it makes sense to regard many of the claims made about the 
preconditions of consent as “deontic musts” which all negotiators must comply with. 
This is necessary if the resulting agreement can be regarded as having been 
voluntarily agreed to which many authors insist is crucial if the agreement is to be 
regarded as morally binding. Conversely, one might regard the claims authors make 
about co-compromisers accommodating the other side and/or refraining from 
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pushing their adversaries to make disproportionate concessions as merely describing 
features of morally attractive political compromises. These latter claims do not seem 
to be obligatory in the same way.   
However, residual moral claims of the relevant kind can emerge regardless of 
how we interpret the requirements of ethical compromise-making. If one sees these 
requirements as “deontic musts” it is uncontroversial that a negotiating party has 
residual moral claim if they are subjected to tough negotiation tactics. Importantly, 
this is so even if such nefarious behaviour is expected. That one expects another party 
to act deceitfully, and therefore is not in fact deceived when they do, does not 
necessarily mean that one has not been wronged.55 Similarly, even if one expects their 
co-compromiser to disregard these deontic musts, and thus negotiates suspiciously, it 
does not follow they are not wronged. For such behaviour to be rightful, one would 
have to hold that the obligation that representatives have to robustly advocate for their 
representees suspends the countervailing moral demand that compromise 
agreements be voluntarily consented to. But if one endorses the kind of value 
pluralism that motivates the dirty hands discussion it makes more sense to see both 
demands as “absolute” in the sense described earlier, where this means neither lapses 
even if one is overridden by the other in particular circumstances.  
From the opposite direction, if one frames the principles of ethics in 
compromise as ways of achieving “good” or “morally attractive” compromises there 
are still grounds for thinking that third parties have legitimate residual moral claims 
against agents who negotiate toughly. To see why, instead of taking as given that the 
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salient perspective is that of the other party in negotiation, we need to expand our 
perspective of who can be wronged by such behaviour and on what grounds by 
asking how all those who have a stake and interest in the long-term health of 
democratic dispute resolution should regard such behaviour. Once we take up this 
point of view, a way of making sense of the moral costs of tough political negotiation 
comes into view.   
P1. Because compromising is a reliable way of peacefully improving the status quo 
and avoiding public harm we should condemn behaviours that foreseeably undermine 
the practice of political compromise.   
 
P2. The readiness to seek out mutually beneficial compromises in the future is likely 
to turn on whether or not one feels resentful about the ways they have been treated by 
adversaries in past negotiations.56 
 
P3. Overriding the requirements of ethical compromise-making is likely to generate 
such resentments.  
 
C. Therefore, by overriding the requirements of ethical compromise-making one can 
be condemned for foreseeably playing a role in undermining a valuable political 
practice.  
 
How can P2 and P3 be vindicated? As many of the advocates of ethics in 
compromise suggest, negotiating in these ways is a way of respecting one’s co-
compromisers and supporting the value of reciprocity. If one side feels like they have 
not been afforded such respect, they are likely to resent it and these resentments will 
colour their attitude toward future compromise opportunities. To see this point, let us 
return to our earlier subject of discussion, Brexit. Because tough negotiation 
(understandably) shaped the negotiations concerning the withdrawal agreement, at 
the time of writing we are (predictably) in a situation where neither side is making a 
good faith attempt to resolve outstanding issues, like the Northern Ireland protocol, 
in a way that is likely to secure mutually beneficial, long-term co-operation between 
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the UK and EU. The previous (tough) negotiations have ensured that good faith is in 
short supply and distrust and ill-feeling abound. Because of this, the UK and EU are 
becoming increasingly intransigent. Countess people, not just the inhabitants of 
Northern Ireland, have a right to be resentful about this. It not only has a very real 
chance of diminishing many people’s economic prospects; it might even undermine 
the Northern Ireland peace process.  
This suggests that even if some of the requirements of ethical compromise 
making should not be regarded as “deontic musts” tough negotiation is likely to 
generate residual moral claims because compromises are reliably effective ways of 
improving the political status quo and tough negotiation is likely to undermine the 
practice of seeking out mutually beneficial compromises in the long-run.  
None of this implies that elected representatives have dominant reasons to 
refrain from being tough negotiators in every negotiation; it just illustrates why 
negotiating important political compromises is so morally fraught. Most citizens 
recognise that functioning democracies are built on mutually satisfactory 
compromises while disliking particular compromises that threaten their principles 
and preferred outcomes.57 Similarly, though we have reason to value behaviour that 
sustains mutually beneficial compromise-making it does not follow that we must 
want our representatives to refrain from negotiating toughly tout court.  
Third, one might object to my argument by claiming that if the ethical 
principles of good compromise-making obtain then citizens cannot reasonably 
complain if their representatives refrain from negotiating “toughly”. After all, we do 
not think that to act responsibly other kinds of representatives have reason to advocate 
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for their representees in ways that violate ethical principles that constrain the 
robustness of their advocacy. For example, it is implausible to claim that to be a good 
legal advocate, a lawyer must be prepared to violate the prohibition against falsifying 
evidence to strengthen their clients’ case. This is why clients cannot reasonably 
complain if their lawyer refrains from falsifying evidence. Similarly, one might claim 
that political representatives must abide by moral constraints of ethical compromise-
making even if this limits the effectiveness of their advocacy, with the result that their 
representees cannot reasonably complain if they refrain from negotiating “toughly”.     
However, this analogical argument is misleading. If a party to a legal dispute 
falsifies evidence, the other side can appeal to an established third-party who has the 
authority to sanction such behaviour. That a third party who is tasked with enforcing 
compliance with the relevant standards exists is fundamental to our judgements about 
the nature of responsible legal advocacy. It ensures that lawyers have reason to believe 
that according with the relevant constraints will not unfairly harm their clients 
because they can be reasonably confident their opponents will do the same. This 
simply is not the case when we think about political compromise. There is no 
analogous, independent third party who possesses the power and/or authority to 
adjudicate such disputes and to sanction political representatives who fail to abide by 
the principles of ethical compromise-making. This lack of an enforcement mechanism 
explains political representatives cannot be confident that the other side will accord 
with the requirements of ethical compromise making.  
Fourth, rather than thinking about the morality of political compromise in 
terms of dirty hands, one might insist that a single set of moral constraints determine 
what steps can legitimately be taken on behalf of any political constituency and these 
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limit what a political representative of any such constituency is morally permitted to 
do in advancing the interests of the constituency. On this view, one is an admirable 
representative to the extent that one advocates tenaciously within these constraints.58  
Though this is a coherent way to think about the ethics of political compromise, 
it has two unwelcome implications. First, this approach presumes that a supreme 
moral principle or more fundamental moral decision-procedure can arbitrate between 
the demands of ethics in compromise and robust representation in order to determine 
what the relevant underlying “single set of moral constraints” are. But this requires a 
positive argument, which has not been forthcoming. And, as I have shown, advocates 
of the dirty hands thesis are sceptical that moral theories which attempt to explain 
away moral conflicts in this way will succeed, primarily because they will fail to do 
justice to our lived moral experience.  
Second, holding that there is a genuine conflict of duties at play, as the dirty 
hands view I am defending does, captures the widespread sense that, in a democracy, 
compromise agreements are morally fraught precisely because we feel that 
representatives both ought to robustly advocate for their representees and also pursue 
compromises that further the values associated with the theories of ethics in 
compromise which all citizens may benefit from. My view captures the sense that 
robust representation matters, but that it is not the only moral claim that matters when 
politicians forge compromises with their adversaries, far better than the alternative 
approach to the morality political compromise under consideration here can.   
Additionally, one might argue that no residual moral claims can obtain if 
politicians compromise ethically because all citizens have reason to appreciate the 
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democratic value of well-crafted political compromises forged in accordance with the 
requirements of ethics-in-compromise. Beerbohm’s approach to thinking about the 
ethics of political compromise arguably suggests such a view.59 He maintains that the 
democratic value of “deciding together” or “co-owning” legislation explains how 
compromise can make political decision-making “morally better” than it would 
otherwise be.60 To make this point, Beerbohm utilises the idea that citizens stand in a 
principal-agent relationship with their representatives and takes this to show that if 
political representatives compromise in a “non-strategic” way – i.e. by refraining from 
toughly pursuing a set of sectarian ends, instead choosing to offer unforced 
concessions to the other side – they should be regarded as offering these concessions 
to other citizens.61 He thus claims that the act of compromising secures a certain kind 
of valuable democratic relationship. This implies that citizens cannot reasonably 
complain if their representatives opt to accord with the requirements of ethics in 
compromise and refrain from acting as tenacious advocates for their partisan claims. 
It follows that refusing to accord with the requirements of ethics in compromise is 
objectionable from every relevant point of view. “Tough” negotiation would not be 
morally wrong but politically admirable – it would just be wrong, plain and simple. 
Beerbohm may deny that this extrapolation fairly extends the logic of his 
argument. He refers to compromise negotiations as “partially suspended contexts” 
and claims we need to “find a place for strategic speech” in these settings.62 But I 
struggle to see how compromises reached following the use of the kind of strategic 
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speech and behaviour he has in mind are compatible with the “co-ownership” view 
he champions. Utilising such tactics undermines the idea that the resulting 
compromise is co-owned in the normatively appealing sense of the term that 
Beerbohm’s argument depends on. 
In any case, the general claim that no residual moral claims can obtain if 
politicians compromise ethically because all citizens have reason to appreciate the 
democratic value political compromises forged in accordance with the requirements 
of ethics-in-compromise is unconvincing. Though the claim that we co-own the 
decisions our representatives make on our behalf seems to follow from the 
understanding of the principal-agent relationship theorists like Beerbohm employ, the 
idea of co-ownership only possesses the suggested edifying democratic implications 
in certain idealised conditions. For such an argument to succeed, citizens would have 
to regard their representative’s conduct when negotiating as largely within their 
control. If they do not enjoy this kind of control, citizens merely co-own their elected 
representatives’ decisions in much the same way that Hobbesian subjects co-own the 
actions of their almighty sovereign – in a purely formal sense that lacks any 
democratically appealing features. Something is done on their behalf, but without any 
meaningful input from them.  
It is a staple of contemporary political science that citizens do not enjoy much 
control of this sort.63 As John Dunn has long argued, though our rulers are in some 
sense accountable to us, it is an illusion to think that we possess the ability to 
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meaningfully determine their decisions or actions.64 It is thus hard to see how 
negotiated political compromises in political societies like our own have the edifying 
democratic implications Beerbohm invokes.  
These sceptical reminders call into question the idea that citizens of modern 
democracies enjoy the kind of political autonomy celebrated in various strains of 
contemporary democratic theory. But given that a clear-eyed understanding of 
contemporary political life supports these sceptical reminders, this is a problem for 
those views rather than the argument defended in this article. My view is less 
vulnerable to these features of modern democratic politics. I have not claimed that 
citizens “co-own” legislation in the wholesomely democratic way that Beerbohm’s 
account trades on. I have merely argued that, in a democracy, politicians must act as 
faithful and committed advocates for their representees. 
Finally, it might be thought that if one adopts a Burkean view of a 
representative's duty the problem I have highlighted becomes much less irremediable 
than I have painted it as being. On such a view, as members of a national parliament, 
elected political representatives must make judgements about what is in the interest 
of the public at large rather than their own constituents. With this in mind, one might 
be tempted to conclude that when Burkean representatives forge political 
compromises they do not have good reason to negotiate toughly because they are not 
merely delegates of their constituents but engaged in a different kind of political 
activity. The conflict I have highlighted between tough advocacy and ethics in 
compromise might be thought to fall away, at least to some extent.65  
                                               
64 John Dunn, “Democratic Theory”. In Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1 – 28.  
65 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to examine this objection.  
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But a Burkean perspective on representation only undoes the conflict I have 
highlighted if one holds, firstly, that by negotiating “softly” Burkean representatives 
will converge on the national interest, and second, that all representatives will 
recognise this and change their negotiating tactics accordingly. These are clearly very 
controversial suggestions. If one disputes that democratic politics is ever likely to 
function in this highly idealised way for a prolonged period of time, as I believe we 
should, the conflict I have in mind will obtain in some form or other. Indeed, absent 
some fantastical convergence story, Burkean representatives who believe they are 
obliged to represent the public at large, rather than their own constituents, but who 
come to distinct judgements about what that requires or involves, will feel the need to 
negotiate “toughly” in order to act as faithful and committed advocates for the public 
whom they represent. 
 
Conclusion  
In this article I have argued that although we have reason to value the actions of 
politicians who forge harm-mitigating and status-quo improving compromises they 
are likely to dirty their hands when compromising because they will not be able to 
resolve without remainder the conflict between the requirements of ethical 
compromise-making and the obligation they have to act as faithful and committed 
advocates for their representees. It is in this sense that forging political compromises 
can be politically admirable whilst simultaneously involving uncancelled moral 
wrongdoing. 
 Though I have not addressed the issue of how politicians might compromise 
well my argument implies that the best we can hope for is a form of responsible 
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compromise-making that attempts to do some justice to the distinct values that 
underpin the principled arguments that can be made in favour of ethical compromise-
making and robust representation. A clear-eyed analysis of this core issue in political 
ethics thus reaffirms Max Weber’s fundamental lesson about the vocation of politics. 
Weber stresses that responsible politicians must ‘truly feel what they are taking upon 
themselves’ and maintain an unflinching focus on the foreseeable consequences of 
their actions.66 When forging compromises that improve the political status quo 
responsible politicians must do exactly that. The truthful among them will also 
acknowledge that even if the decision to compromise can be vindicated on balance, 
the process of compromising will generate dirt that lingers nevertheless because the 
moral costs of political compromises do not come out in the wash. They will also 
recognise that determining how the resulting resentments and disappointments 
should be managed, and how they can be contained, is incredibly important for the 
long term health of their polities. But this is, ultimately, a question of political 
judgement about which, I suspect, there is little that political theorists can say at the 
philosophical level.   
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